The events of 9/11 and subsequent acts of jihadist terrorism, together with the failures of intelligence agencies over Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, have arguably heralded a new age of intelligence. For some this takes the form of a crisis of legitimacy. For others the threat of cataclysmic terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack gives added poignancy to the academic contention that intelligence failure is inevitable. Many of the challenges facing intelligence appear to be both new and deeply worrying. In response, intelligence has clearly taken on new forms and new agendas. How these various developments are viewed depends upon the historical, normative and political frameworks in which they are analysed. This book addresses fundamental questions arising in this new age. The central aim of the collection is to identify key issues and questions and subject them to interrogation from different methodological perspectives using internationally acclaimed experts in the field. A key focus in the collection is on British and North American perspectives. Recent trends and debates about the organisation and conduct of intelligence provide key themes for exploration. Underpinning several contributions is the recognition that intelligence faces a conflict of ideas as much as practices and threats. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

The events of 9/11 and subsequent acts of jihadist terrorism, together with the failures of intelligence agencies over Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, have arguably heralded a new age of intelligence. For some this takes the form of a crisis of legitimacy. For others the threat of cataclysmic terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack gives added poignancy to the academic contention that intelligence failure is inevitable. Many of the challenges facing intelligence appear to be both new and deeply worrying. In response, intelligence has clearly taken on new forms and new agendas. How these various developments are viewed depends upon the historical, normative and political frameworks in which they are analysed. This book addresses fundamental questions arising in this new age. The central aim of the collection is to identify key issues and questions and subject them to interrogation from different methodological perspectives using internationally acclaimed experts in the field. A key focus in the collection is on British and North American perspectives. Recent trends and debates about the organisation and conduct of intelligence provide key themes for exploration. Underpinning several contributions is the recognition that intelligence faces a conflict of ideas as much as practices and threats. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

This volume brings together a collection of leading international experts to revisit and review our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, via a critical reappraisal of some of the key texts. In October 1962, humankind came close to the end of its history. The risk of catastrophe is now recognised by many to have been greater than realised by protagonists at the time or scholars subsequently. The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the mostly intensely studied moments of world history. Understanding is framed and informed by Cold War historiography, political science and personal experience, written by scholars, journalists, and surviving officials. The emergence of Soviet (later Russian) and other national narratives has broadened the scope of enquiry, while scrutiny of the operational, especially military, dimensions has challenged assumptions about the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal brings together world leading scholars from America, Britain, France, Canada, and Russia to present critical scrutiny of authoritative accounts and to recast assumptions and interpretations. The book aims to provide an essential guide for students of the missile crisis, the diplomacy of the Cold War, and the dynamics of historical interpretation and reinterpretation. Offering original ideas and agendas, the contributors seek to provide a new understanding of the secrets and mysteries of the moment when the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This book will be of great interest to students of the Cuban missile crisis, Cold War Studies, nuclear proliferation, international history and International Relations in general.

It is sixty years since the events of October 1962 brought the world close to nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban missile crisis has long been recognised as the moment of greatest danger in the life (and near death) of humanity. In those sixty years, our knowledge and understanding of events have undergone significant change. There are some reasons to be encouraged, inasmuch as we have learned how both President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to avoid nuclear war. More ominously, we have learned of incidents and events that suggest nuclear weapons might have been used by subordinate military commanders, in circumstances frequently unknown to their political leaders. Decisions whether to use nuclear weapons lay in the hands of often junior military commanders, some of whom were perilously close to crossing the nuclear threshold. This does not mean – as often assumed – that if some nuclear weapons were used, escalation to all-out war was inevitable. Yet the undoubted risk of thermonuclear war in these circumstances threatened the very survival of civilisation. Hundreds, if not thousands, of millions of people would have died from immediate and short-term effects, while the longer-term prospect of a ‘Nuclear Winter’ portended the virtual extinction of humanity. Drawing lessons from sixty years ago faces significant challenges. If we draw lessons only to discover our understanding was mistaken, we might well have drawn the wrong lessons. Many received wisdoms about the crisis have been shown to be misleading. What is striking is how after forty or fifty or even sixty years, new evidence has emerged to challenge previously accepted explanations. It is for the reader to reach their own verdicts on the history of the crisis, and how much we owe to political leaders who averted catastrophe (as well as how their words and deeds helped create the crisis in the first place). It is for the reader to conclude how close we came to nuclear war. Whatever conclusions are reached, one overriding lesson looms large. However we judge the actions of political and military leaders, one factor was crucial in why we avoided nuclear war in 1962. It was luck. In October 1962, humanity was very lucky. Will we be so lucky next time? This book is an outstanding contribution to the ever-growing literature on the truly historic set of events making up the ‘Cuban missile crisis’. While experts on the crisis will be familiar with many of the issues confronted, they will discover probably the best-written account of them, will surely learn something new, and be asked to question what they had come to think was settled. - Ken Booth FBA, Distinguished Research Professor, Aberystwyth University

This edited volume addresses the main lessons and legacies of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis from a global perspective. Despite the discoveries of recent research, there is still much more to be revealed about the handling of nuclear weapons before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC). Featuring contributions from a number of eminent international scholars of nuclear history, intelligence, espionage, political science and Cold War studies, An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis reviews and reflects on one of the critical moments of the Cold War, focussing on three key areas. First, the volume highlights the importance of memory as an essential foundation of historical understanding and demonstrates how events that rely only on historical records can provide misleading accounts. This focus on memory extends the scope of the existing literature by exploring hitherto neglected aspects of the CMC, including an analysis of the operational aspects of Bomber Command activity, explored through recollections of the aircrews that challenge accounts based on official records. The editors then go on to explore aspects of intelligence whose achievements and failings have increasingly been recognised to be of central importance to the origins, dynamics and outcomes of the missile crisis. Studies of hitherto neglected organisations such as the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) both extend our understanding of British and American intelligence machinery in this period and enrich our understanding of key episodes and assessments in the missile crisis. Finally, the book explores the risk of nuclear war and looks at how close we came to nuclear conflict. The risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons is evaluated and a new proposed framework for the analysis of nuclear risk put forward. This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, international history, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

Planning Armageddon provides the first detailed account of Britain's Command, Control, Intelligence and Communications infrastructure. A central theme of the book is the British-American atomic relationship and its implications for NATO strategy. Based on the recollections of officials and military officers in both Britain and the United States and employing recently declassified government documents, Planning Armageddon presents a systematic analysis of British involvement in nuclear planning from Hiroshima to the development of Polaris. At the same time, it provides an important examination of the operational weaknesses of the British nuclear deterrent and the potential hazards presented by unwarranted secrecy.

This volume brings together a collection of leading international experts to revisit and review our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, via a critical reappraisal of some of the key texts. In October 1962, humankind came close to the end of its history. The risk of catastrophe is now recognised by many to have been greater than realised by protagonists at the time or scholars subsequently. The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the mostly intensely studied moments of world history. Understanding is framed and informed by Cold War historiography, political science and personal experience, written by scholars, journalists, and surviving officials. The emergence of Soviet (later Russian) and other national narratives has broadened the scope of enquiry, while scrutiny of the operational, especially military, dimensions has challenged assumptions about the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal brings together world leading scholars from America, Britain, France, Canada, and Russia to present critical scrutiny of authoritative accounts and to recast assumptions and interpretations. The book aims to provide an essential guide for students of the missile crisis, the diplomacy of the Cold War, and the dynamics of historical interpretation and reinterpretation. Offering original ideas and agendas, the contributors seek to provide a new understanding of the secrets and mysteries of the moment when the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This book will be of great interest to students of the Cuban missile crisis, Cold War Studies, nuclear proliferation, international history and International Relations in general.

If deception, deceit and manipulation are integral to the business of intelligence gathering - what are the implications for the historical record? Are intelligence archives themselves officially constructed to allow only manipulated histories?

This new book examines these questions and explores how various kinds of people involved in studying and/or practicing intelligence, view texts and issues from different perspectives. It shows how scholars have long sought to make use of relevant archives, but constraints on access to such sources have been considerable. With the end of the Cold War and other changes in official attitudes, more intelligence documents are now becoming available.

This is a fascinating new examination that shows how no document speaks entirely for itself, though some may be more eloquent or assertive than others. The interpretation of the archival record (as indeed the non-archival record) is at the heart of scholarship, and challenges in interpreting textsare generic problems for any researcher.

If deception, deceit and manipulation are integral to the business of intelligence gathering - what are the implications for the historical record? Are intelligence archives themselves officially constructed to allow only manipulated histories?

This new book examines these questions and explores how various kinds of people involved in studying and/or practicing intelligence, view texts and issues from different perspectives. It shows how scholars have long sought to make use of relevant archives, but constraints on access to such sources have been considerable. With the end of the Cold War and other changes in official attitudes, more intelligence documents are now becoming available.

This is a fascinating new examination that shows how no document speaks entirely for itself, though some may be more eloquent or assertive than others. The interpretation of the archival record (as indeed the non-archival record) is at the heart of scholarship, and challenges in interpreting textsare generic problems for any researcher.

This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the 'War on Terror'. Long regarded as the 'missing dimension' of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001. Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence 'overload', intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world. This book was previously published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security and will be essential reading for students of intelligence, intelligence practitioners and general readers alike.

This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the 'War on Terror'. Long regarded as the 'missing dimension' of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001. Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence 'overload', intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world. This book was previously published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

This edited volume addresses the main lessons and legacies of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis from a global perspective. Despite the discoveries of recent research, there is still much more to be revealed about the handling of nuclear weapons before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC). Featuring contributions from a number of eminent international scholars of nuclear history, intelligence, espionage, political science and Cold War studies, An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis reviews and reflects on one of the critical moments of the Cold War, focussing on three key areas. First, the volume highlights the importance of memory as an essential foundation of historical understanding and demonstrates how events that rely only on historical records can provide misleading accounts. This focus on memory extends the scope of the existing literature by exploring hitherto neglected aspects of the CMC, including an analysis of the operational aspects of Bomber Command activity, explored through recollections of the aircrews that challenge accounts based on official records. The editors then go on to explore aspects of intelligence whose achievements and failings have increasingly been recognised to be of central importance to the origins, dynamics and outcomes of the missile crisis. Studies of hitherto neglected organisations such as the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) both extend our understanding of British and American intelligence machinery in this period and enrich our understanding of key episodes and assessments in the missile crisis. Finally, the book explores the risk of nuclear war and looks at how close we came to nuclear conflict. The risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons is evaluated and a new proposed framework for the analysis of nuclear risk put forward. This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, international history, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

The procedures and plans governing the use of Britain's nuclear weapons are fundamental to our understanding of British defence policy. Throughout the Cold War, questions relating to when, where and how British nuclear weapons would ever be used remained hidden from public scrutiny. In addressing these questions, this volume provides a detailed account of Britain's command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure. A central theme of the book is the British-American atomic relationship and its implications for NATO strategy. Based on the recollections of officials and military officers in both Britain and the USA, and employing declassified government documents, the work presents a systematic analysis of British involvement in nuclear planning from Hiroshima to the development of Polaris. At the same time, it provides an examination of the operational weaknesses of the British nuclear deterrent and the potential hazards presented by unwarranted secrecy.